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NOTE
SCHNEIDEWIND V ANR PIPELINE

485 U.S. 293 (1988)
Natural Gas Regulation: Michigan statute regulating the issuance of long-term securities is preempted by the Natural Gas Act
and the Natural Gas Policy Act.

INTRODUCTION
In Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline,' the United States Supreme Court

expanded the comprehensive nature of federal natural gas regulation by
holding that the Michigan Public Service Commission could not regulate
the issuance of long-term utility securities. 2 The Court held that the jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) created
by Congress under the Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) 3 and the Natural

Gas Act (NGA),4 preempted a Michigan law allowing the state to regulate
securities. This note analyzes the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Natural Gas Act and addresses the ramifications of the Schneidewind

decision on future state natural gas regulation.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ANR Pipeline Company (Pipeline) and ANR Storage Company (Stor-

age) operate interstate natural gas transportation and storage facilities in
the state of Michigan. Both companies are owned by the American Natural
Resources Company, which like Pipeline and Storage, is a Delaware
company with its primary place of business in Michigan. Following a

common practice among natural gas companies, Pipeline and Storage
issue a combination of short and long-term securities to finance capital
expenditures.' Short-term debt is used for financing, pending FERC ap1. 485 U.S. 293, 108 S.Ct. 1145 (1988).
2. Id. 485 U.S. at -, 108 S.Ct. at 1154.
3. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3432 (1982). The NGPA was a
congressional response to gas shortages in the early seventies which resulted from the failure of
federal regulations under the Natural Gas Act (NGA) to adapt to the nation's energy crisis. See
Public Service Comm'n of the State of New York v. Mid-Louisiana Gas Co., 463 U.S. 319 (1983).
The aim of the NGPA did not change the goal of the NGA which was comprehensive management
of natural gas. In fact, the NGPA adopted much of the language of the NGA and simply restructured
the natural gas price ceilings to accord with estimates of mid- 1970s supply and demand. See Senate
Report, 95-437, p. 50 (1977) (views of Senators Hansen, Hatfield, McClure, Bartlett, Weicker,
Domenici, and Laxalt).
4. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C §§717-717w (1982). Prior to 1978 and the enactment of
the NGPA, federal natural gas regulation was under the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission

(FPC).
5. Pipeline's capital expenditures include constructing new natural gas transmission and storage
facilities and financing the build-up of gas balances. Build-ups occur during the summer months
when the dimand for natural gas is low. See ANR Pipeline Company v. Schneidewind, 801 F.2d
228, 232 (6th Cir. 1986).
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proval of long-term securities.' Pipeline planned to issue 50 million dollars
in securities in 1986, and 100 million dollars in securities in 1987. 7
Storage planned to issue 27 million dollars in securities in 1987. Before
the companies could proceed, however, they had to clear another hurdle.
In addition to the FERC certificate of public convenience, a Michigan
law (Act 144) required Pipeline and Storage to file an application with
the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) before issuing longterm securities. 9 Act 144 gave MPSC the authority to "investigate, hold
hearings, examine witnesses and any written materials it deems of importance in reaching a determination."'" Any securities issuance granted
by the MPSC was subject to a filing fee payable to the state of Michigan
of one-tenth of one percent of the value of the securities. " Finally, the
MPSC under Act 144 had the authority to deny an application for the
issuance of securities.
In 1985, Pipeline and Storage filed suit in Michigan federal district
court seeking declaratory relief from the Michigan Public Service Commission's jurisdiction over the issuance of long-term securities. 2 Eric
Schneidewind was a member and chairperson of the MPSC.' 3 At issue
was whether Act 144 was preempted by the Natural Gas Act, or alternatively, whether the Michigan regulation burdened interstate commerce
and thus violated the commerce clause. 4 The district court concluded
that Act 144 was not preempted by the NGA and that Michigan's strong
local interest in regulating securities was sufficient to preclude federal
jurisdiction under the commerce clause.' 5 Central to the district court's
6. Because Pipeline and Storage transport and sell natural gas outside Michigan, their rates are
subject to regulation established by FERC. Once subject to FERC jurisdiction, Pipeline and Storage
must obtain a certificate of public convenience before proceeding with construction projects financed
by the sale of long-term securities. FERC regulations require that each application for a certificate
of public convenience include: "(1) a detailed description of applicant's outstanding and proposed
securities and liabilities, . .. (2)the manner in which [the] applicant proposes to dispose of securities
by private sale, . . . (3) a statement showing ...the estimated sale price and estimated net proceeds

to the applicant, [and] (4) an itemized statement of estimated expenses, fees, and commissions to
be paid by applicant in connection with each proposed issue." 18 CFR § 157.14(14) (1988). In
addition. 18 CFR § 157.14(14) requires extensive verification of all documents related to the company's balance sheets, annual amounts of securities issued, and general structure.
7. 801 F.2d at 232.
8. Id.
9. 1909 Mich.Pu.Acts No. 144 (Act 144), codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 460.301 (West
1988).
10. ANR Pipeline v. Schneidewind, 627 F. Supp. 923, 926 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (citing Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §460.301(2) (Supp. 1989)).
1I.Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §460.61 (11) (repealed by P.A. 1978, No. 272 § I (Supp. 1989)).
12. ANR Pipeline Co. v. Schneidewind, 627 F. Supp. 923 (W.D.Mich. 1985).
13. Id.
14. Id.at 926, 930.
15. Id.at 930, 934.
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rationale were two earlier Michigan Supreme Court decisions upholding
the MPSC's jurisdiction. 6
Plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals. 7 The Sixth Circuit reversed
and remanded holding that the supremacy clause' 8 invalidates the Michigan state regulation because it might conflict with federal regulation.' 9
Although a conflict between Michigan and FERC had not yet arisen, the
court envisioned a situation where FERC authorized a construction project
only to have the application for the securities necessary to finance it
denied by the MPSC. 2 Schneidewind and the MPSC applied to the Supreme Court for certiorari.
The Supreme Court granted certioraribased on the conflict which had
arisen between the Sixth Circuit and the Michigan Supreme Court re-

garding the interpretation of Michigan's statute,' By a unanimous vote,22
the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Sixth Circuit, holding
that the Michigan statute was preempted because it infringed on FERC's

power to issue certificates of public convenience.
BACKGROUND
Natural Gas Legislation and the Commerce Clause

The Natural Gas Act of 1938 arose out of the states' inability to regulate
the interstate sale and transportation of natural gas.23 The act was an
exercise of congressional power under the commerce clause.24 Supreme
Court cases prior to 1938 denied the states the right to regulate gas that
was sold to local distributing companies for resale in interstate commerce.25 This created a "no-man's land" in the regulatory framework of
natural gas. Congress enacted the NGA to fill the gaps in regulation and

provide a comprehensive scheme of state and national regulation.
16. Michigan Gas Storage Company v. Michigan Public Service Comm., 405 Mich. 376, 275
N.W.2d 457 (1979), and Indiana and Michigan Power Company v. State of Michigan, 405 Mich.
400, 275 N.W.2d 450 (1979). In both these cases, Michigan argued successfully that its regulation
was not a regulation of natural gas rates and facilities, which it conceded was under the elusive
jurisdiction of FERC. Rather, Act 144 was designed to protect Michigan's ratepayers by "assuring
continued service without interruption from utilities and in receiving that service at reasonable rates."
Michigan Gas Storage, 275 N.W.2d at 462.
17. ANR Pipeline Co. v. Schneidewind, 801 F2d 228 (6th Cir. 1986).
18. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl.2.
19. 801 F.2d at 235.
20. Id. at 235-36.
21. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
22. Id. (Justice Kennedy not participating).
23. See Hearing before the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1937).
24. Congress shall have power to regulate commerce. U.S. Const. art, 1, § 8, cl.3.
25. For an analysis of Supreme Court decisions which led to the enactment of the Natural Gas
Act, see Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1941).
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Initial interpretations of the scope of the act strictly limited the power
of the federal government under the NGA to areas where the states could
not effectively regulate. PanhandleEastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n26 is typical of the Supreme Court's early reasoning. Panhandle
involved an Indiana statute which attempted to regulate natural gas sold
directly to the citizens of Indiana by an interstate pipeline. Under the
statute, before an interstate gas company could sell directly to Indiana it
had "to file tariffs, rules and regulations, [and] annual reports . .. " with
the Indiana Public Service Commission.27 Panhandle Eastern Pipeline
Company brought suit claiming that the Indiana statute violated the commerce clause by subjecting an interstate natural gas pipeline to state
regulation.
The Supreme Court held that congressional enactment of the Natural
Gas Act did not forbid state regulation involving direct sales of natural
gas. 2" In reaching this holding, the Court went directly to the legislative
history behind the NGA.
Three things and three only Congress drew within its own regulatory
power, delegated by the Act to its agent, the Federal Power Commission. These were: (1) the transportation of natural gas in interstate
commerce; (2) its sale in interstate commerce for resale; and (3)
natural gas companies engaged in such transportation or sale.2"
The Court further stated that the Natural Gas Act was never intended to
totally occupy the area of natural gas regulation.' Rather, Congress "was
meticulous to take in only territory which this Court had held the states
could not reach."a"
The dual system of state and federal regulation created under the NGA
was further defined in FederalPower Comm'n v. TranscontinentalGas
Pipe Line Corp32 (Transco). In Transco, the Court took the initial step
towards an expanded federal system of natural gas regulation. Transcontinental Corp. entered into a contract with Consolidated Edison Company,
a New York public utility, to deliver 50,000 metric cubic feet (mcf) daily
for direct use under Consolidated's boilers. The Federal Power Commission argued that use of natural gas under the boilers which had previously used coal, was inefficient and did not address conservation
concerns.33 Gas for direct sale being transported in interstate pipelines
26. 332 U.S. 507 (1947).
27. Id. at 509.
28. Central to this analysis is the distinction between gas sold for direct consumption and gas
sold for resale. Direct sale gas is not resold in interstate commerce. An example is gas bought by
a utility to bum under its boilers.
29. Panhandle, 332 U.S. at 516.

30. Id. at 519.
31. Id.
32. 365 U.S. 1 (1961).
33. Id. at 4-5.
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would occupy space which otherwise would contain gas intended for
resale. The FPC argued that the direct result of this would be less gas
for resale and higher prices. Consolidated countered by arguing that use
of natural gas would reduce the pollution which resulted from coal burning
boilers. 4 The FPC agreed with Consolidated on the question of pollution,
but denied a certificate of convenience and necessity" for the use of direct
sale natural gas under the burners because it believed that the use of
interstate pipelines for direct sale gas affected the price and quantity of
resale gas being transported in the same pipelines.
The issue on appeal in Transco was whether the Federal Power Commission had the jurisdiction to deny a certificate of public convenience
and necessity for a direct sale of natural gas to consumers. Although the
gas at issue was classified as direct, and therefore was not specifically
included within FPC jurisdiction under the NGA, the allotment between
amounts of direct and resale gas shipped in interstate transport occurred
during interstate transport and outside of the destination state.' Therefore,
in effect the gas would be subject to neither federal or state regulation if
the government did not step in.
To ensure that all natural gas sales were subject to either state or federal
regulation, the Supreme Court in Transco developed a test to determine
when the federal regulatory scheme should intervene. "[l]n a borderline
case where congressional authority is not explicit we must ask whether
state authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that
37
it cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority governs.
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the Court found that the State
could not regulate and therefore the FPC was justified in denying a
certificate of public convenience. Thus, the Court in Transco took the
NGA beyond the literal construction of its wording to allow federal regulation of the allotment of direct and resale gas which occurred in the
interstate market. The Court was unwilling to allow new "post-NGA"
gaps to develop in the state regulatory scheme.
Significant change in the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Natural
Gas Act as a dual federal and state system of comprehensive regulation
came two years later in Northern Natural Gas Company v. State Corporation Commission" (Northern Natural). At issue in Northern Natural
34. Id.
35. Under § 717(b) of the NGA, direct sales of natural gas are not subject to federal jurisdiction.
15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (1982). However, an interstate gas producer selling directly to a utility must
still obtain a certificate of public convenience under §717f(e) (1982). In the 1938 version of the
Natural Gas Act, the FPC's certification power did not include an analysis of conservation goalsthese being specifically reserved for the states. The 1942 amendments which represent the current
law, gave the FPC a broader power to consider conservation factors when issuing certificates of
public convenience. See Panhandle, 332 U.S. at 517.
36. See Transco, 365 U.S. at 20.
37. Id. at 19, 20.
38. 372 U.S. 84 (1963).
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was a Kansas statute that required interstate purchasers of natural gas to
purchase gas in equal amounts from each well in a gas field within the
state. 9 When Northern Natural Gas Company (Northern) began purchasing its gas primarily from one source, the Kansas Corporation Commission intervened and ordered the company not to discriminate among
producers. Northern claimed that this statute sought to regulate in an area
under the control of the NGA. The Kansas Supreme Court disagreed,'
and Northern appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court held the statute unconstitutional, and in doing so
redefined the "comprehensive" nature of the NGA. "The federal regulatory scheme leaves no room either for direct state regulation of the
prices of interstate wholesales of natural gas (citation omitted), or for
state regulations which would indirectly achieve the same result." 4 Although the Kansas statute did not directly affect the interstate market, the
Court reasoned that allowing the Kansas State Corporation Commission
to determine when an interstate purchaser had to purchase ratably42 would
impair the Federal Power Commission's authority to regulate with the
national interest in mind.4 Moreover, the Court believed that the Kansas
statute would seriously impair the FPC's function of determining a nationwide price structure designed to protect the consumer."
Central to the Supreme Court's reasoning in Northern Natural was the
development of the "imminent possibility of collision" test to determine
when a state regulation with an indirect effect on interstate commerce
was preempted. Any potential for conflict between a state and federal
regulation was sufficient to hold the state statute unconstitutional even if
the collision between statutes was not inevitable. 45 Therefore, although
the Kansas statute requiring ratable take had not interfered with FPC, the
Court found that the potential for interference was sufficient to hold the
Kansas statute unconstitutional.
Recent developments in the Court's interpretation of the NGA and
NGA preemption of state statutes follow the reasoning established in
39. The purchase of equal amounts of gas from each well on a natural gas field is known as
ratable take. The reason for requiring a company to purchase ratably stems from the geological
distribution of natural gas in a natural gas field. If there are ten wells on one field and gas is being
drawn from only one of those wells, the gas in the field will all be drawn to the one well which is
operating. Id.
40. Northern Nat. Gas. Co. v. State Corp. Comm'n of Kan., 188 Kan. 351, 362 P.2d 609 (1961)
(rev'd, 372 U.S. 84 (1962)).
41. Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 91.
42. A ratable purchase occurs when a natural gas purchaser buys an equal amount of gas from
each well in a natural gas field. This is done to prevent one well from selling all the gas in the field.
43. Northern Natural, 372 U.S. at 92.

44. id.
45. Id.
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Transco and Northern Natural.4 6 The enactment of the Natural Gas Policy
Act in 1978 did nothing to limit expansion of the jurisdictional boundaries
of federal natural gas regulation.47 In fact, after the NGPA, the only clear
distinction between state and federal regulatory jurisdiction is in the intrastate gas market. Any state statute which arguably begins to step outside
the intrastate market impinges on FERC's jurisdiction and is subject to
the Court's scrutiny. The Michigan securities law was just this type of
statute.
ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Schneidewind continues the Court's
expansion of the comprehensive nature of the Natural Gas Act and the
Natural Gas Policy Act. By invalidating the Michigan securities statute,
the Court extended its reasoning in Transco and Northern Natural to a
statute that does not address any of the three areas Congress sought to
regulate in passing the Natural Gas Act." Rather than fill a gap in regulation, the Schneidewind Court struck down a relatively minor state
regulation which in the long run may have been more effective and
efficient than FERC's attempt at regulating securities. To fully understand
the ramifications of the Supreme Court's decision, it is necessary to
analyze the contrary result reached in the lower court decisions.
The Courts Tackle the Problem
Both the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan and
the Michigan Supreme Court held that Michigan's law regulating issuance
of long-term securities was not preempted by the Natural Gas Act because
there was not an "imminent possibility" of conflict between the state and
federal laws. The approach taken by both courts adopted the idea of
comprehensive federal regulation of natural gas. Both courts, however,
were unwilling to extend federal regulatory power derived from the NGA
and NGPA into state regulation of securities. This approach was consistent
with the literal interpretation of both natural gas statutes.
The Michigan Supreme Court focused on the test established in Florida
Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul9 to determine whether a state
and federal regulation could co-exist. "The test . . . is not whether the
46. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621 (1972);
Arkansas Electric Coop. Corp. v. Arkansas Public Service Comm'n, 461 U.S. 375 (1983).
47. See Transcontinental Gas Pipe v. State Oil and Gas Board of Mississippi, 474 U.S. 409
(1986) (the Court applied an almost identical Northern Natural analysis in holding state ratable take
statutes unconstitutionalunder the NGPA).
48. See Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 332 U.S. 507 (1947).
49. 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
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regulatory purposes of each are aimed at similar or different objectives,
but rather whether the regulations of both can be enforced without impairing the federal superintendence of the field. "" Central to the Michigan
court's reasoning was the fact that the Federal Power Commission had
explicit authority over natural gas rates and not over the issuance of
securities." The court believed that although securities had some effect
on rates, regulation of securities could not be equated with regulation of
rates.
Indeed, we believe it to be unlikely in the extreme that Congress
intended the enactment of rate regulation ... to be understood to
preclude the valid exercise of state authority over securities. The
purpose of the Natural Gas Act was to fill gaps in the regulation of
utility companies, not to create them. If the state does not regulate
this security issuance . . . , no authority would, 2
The federal district court applied the three part Supreme Court test
created in Michigan Canners & Freezers Assoc., Inc. v. Agricultural
Marketing & BargainingBoard5 ' in reaching its decision. First, Congress
did not explicitly mandate preemption of state law. Second, the Natural
Gas Act does not imply that states cannot regulate issuance of securities.
And third, the state law does not conflict with the federal law.
The plaintiffs' argument focused on the third prong of the test. Plaintiffs
claimed that FERC's certificate proceedings,' which include authority to
review and consider long-term financing projects," would be burdened
by the Michigan Securities Law. They argued that FERC's regulation of
a company's rates, services, and facilities was "inextricably" connected
to a company's method of financing.' The district court disagreed and
held that "review of financial data in the context of certificate or rate
proceedings is not the functional equivalent of requiring pre-issuance
approval by FERC."" The court noted that the Michigan Securities law
had yet to actually disrupt FERC's authority.
Both lower courts reached the real question in Schneidewind: How far
could FERC's jurisdiction reach? Neither court was willing to accept the
plaintiffs' argument that because FERC looked at a company's capital
structure in issuing certificates of public convenience it fully preempted
50. Michigan Gas Storage Company v. Michigan Public Service Comm., 405 Mich. 376, 383,
275 N.W.2d 457, 464 (1979).
51. Id.
52. Id. (emphasis added).
53. 467 U.S. 461 (1984).
54. See supra, note 6.
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. ANR Pipeline Co. v. Schneidewind, 627 F.Supp 923, 929 (W.D.Mich. 1985).
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the field. The U.S. court of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court, however,
took issue with the district court's rationale.
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision. The court
of appeals held that even though Congress had not specifically addressed
securities regulation, the Michigan Act was preempted because it interfered with the "comprehensive nature" of natural gas regulation. Central
to this analysis was FERC's role in issuing long-term certificates of
convenience. The Sixth Circuit reasoned that a conflict could arise between a ruling by FERC and an alternative decision by the Michigan
Public Service Commission.
A direct conflict between FERC and MPSC could easily occur where
FERC, acting in the national interest, authorizes the construction of
facilities in a state other than Michigan, requiring the issuance of
additional securities, and MPSC, acting in a perceived local interest,
refuses to approve the issuance of securities. 5
Although the court agreed with the federal district court that this type of
interference had not yet occurred, the "imminent possibility" of a collision between the state and federal law was sufficient to declare the state
law unconstitutional.59
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed with the district court and the court
of appeals that the Natural Gas Act did not expressly prohibit Michigan
from regulating securities. The Court's examination of the preemption
question centered on the Congress' implicit right to occupy a given field,
in this case, the regulation of natural gas rates. "Such a purpose properly
may be inferred where the pervasiveness of the federal regulation precludes supplementation by the States, where the federal interest in the
field is sufficiently dominant, or where 'the object sought to be obtained
by the federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it...
reveal the same purpose.'""
In reaching its conclusion that the Michigan law was preempted, the
Supreme Court focused on the role that a company's capital structure
played in FERC's regulatory function. First, FERC could look at a company's capital in determining a "just and reasonable" rate for the transportation or sale of natural gas. 6 Central to this argument was FERC's
58. ANR Pipeline Co. v. Schneidewind, 801 F.2d 228, 235 (6th Cir, 1986).
59. Id. at 236, (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 751 (1981)).
60. Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, -,
108 S. Ct. 1145, 1150 (1988),
(quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
61. See §4 of NGA, 76 Stat. 72 (1962) (codified as amended at, 15 U.S.C. §717c (1988)).
Section 717c(e) gives FERC the right to conduct hearings to determine whether the proposed rate
increase is in the public interest. This can include a detailed examination of the capital structure of
the company if FERC believes that a company's extension of debt jeopardizes the natural gas market.
See Public Service Comm'n of New York v. FERC, 813 F.2d 448, 458 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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ability to base the rates of a company with an unreasonable debt to equity
ratio' on an assumed capital structure of a company without an equity
or debt problem. 63 The Court reasoned that FERC's authority to analyze
a company's capital structure in deciding whether to grant a rate increase
gave FERC indirect control of the company's capital structure.' Under

this assumption, for example, a company whose percentage of equity
was excessive would reduce it to avoid FERC's application of a rate
structure which did not correspond to the actual percentage of equity in
the company's capital structure.
The Court next looked to FERC's requirement that a company seeking
to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity first file a

detailed description of any proposed securities issuance." The Court
reasoned that because FERC's grant of certification contained such a
detailed examination of a company's financial structure, FERC again had

the indirect ability to deny a company's certification based on its capital
structure. Combined with additional grants of power under the NGA,'
including FERC's right to change any rule or regulation it found discriminatory or preferential, 67 the Court reasoned that FERC already exercised the regulatory control over long-term securities which Michigan
sought. Therefore, the Michigan law was preempted.
Ramifications of the Schneidewind Decision
After Schneidewind, it is conceivable that any state action that reaches
the interstate market for natural gas could be declared invalid. Although
the Supreme Court has not gone so far as to say that FERC occupies the
field of natural gas regulation, the Court has expansively interpreted the
reach of FERC's regulation. The Court's approach has taken the NGA
and NGPA beyond the "gap-filling" role Congress originally envisioned.
62. A debt to equity ratio measures the percentage of a company's capital structure made up of
borrowed money (debt) against the percentage of the capital structure raised through stock issues
(equity). In a regulated business there is a range of debt to equity ratios that are appropriate. The
appropriateness depends on the riskiness of the business. The riskier it is, the more equity it should
have because stockholders do not have to be paid at times when cash is hard to come by. When
stockholders run this risk, they demand a higher return on their investment than do debtholders. To
the extent that companies have a higher percentage of equity than riskiness demands, they, and
ultimately their consumers, pay more for capital than necessary.
63. Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at -,
108 S.Ct at 1151 (citing Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas
Co., 38 FERC 61,251, at 61,849 (1987). aff'd in relevant part on reh'g, 40 FERC 61,244, at
61,813 (1987).
64. Id.
65. See supra note 6.
66. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717k (1982). prohibiting officers and directors of natural gas companies
from profiting from the company's securities issues; id. § 717f(b), preventing a company from
abandoning a natural gas site without a finding that the gas is depleted or that public convenience
permits abandonment; id. §§ 717g and 717i, requiring a natural gas company to keep its accounts
in accordance with FERC's Uniform System of Accounts.
67. Id. §717d(a).
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States are left with the difficult task of trying to design laws to protect
their citizens without stepping over the line into FERC's jurisdiction.
Schneidewind makes it perfectly clear that the Supreme Court will not
allow peaceful coexistence among state and federal regulations. If there
is the possibility of a conflict, FERC will be declared the winner.
While the concept of comprehensive regulation is attractive and serves
an important function in maintaining a uniform regulatory scheme, at
some point dual state and federal regulation, as a practical matter, should
be allowed to coexist. When FERC's jurisdiction expands, so do its
responsibilities. After Schneidewind, FERC is responsible for regulating
the capital structure of a natural gas company in addition to its rates.
Although the capital structure of a company is one factor FERC should
analyze in determining whether to issue certificates of convenience, giving
FERC sole responsibility in this area seems excessive.
Under a dual regulatory scheme, one possible alternative would be to
have Michigan continue regulation of securities with the understanding
that FERC would adopt Michigan's analysis of a company's capital structure unless it was clearly erroneous. FERC would benefit from this scenario in two ways. First, FERC would not be required to analyze corporate
capital structures on a day to day basis. And second, the Michigan Public
Service Commission could use its particular knowledge of Michigan natural gas companies to provide FERC with unique insights into the strengths
and weaknesses of the Michigan natural gas market. FERC would have
the information it needed to protect the comprehensive interests of the
country, and Michigan would be able to best protect its natural gas consumers.
Absent this dual system of regulation, it is the Michigan consumers
who suffer. If FERC alone is responsible for regulating long-term securities, the consumers have an extremely limited ability to protect their
interests. When FERC is deciding whether to allow a long-term security
issue to fund a Michigan construction project, any consumer input into
this decision will only be heard in Washington at the FERC hearings. It
is economically unrealistic to assume that Michigan consumers would
travel to Washington to have their opinions heard.
One additional alternative to the post Schneidewind regulatory scheme
that could satisfy both- consumer and state interests would be to have
FERC travel to Michigan for its hearings. Consumers' voices would be
heard, and the Michigan Public Service Commission could present FERC
with its views on the necessity of long-term securities issues from the
unique state perspective that only Michigan officials possess. FERC would
retain the exclusive jurisdiction over the issuance of securities given to
it in Schneidewind and in addition FERC's final decision would be much
more informed. Only when both sides compromise can natural gas regulation be uniform and effective.

238
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CONCLUSION

The Schneidewind decision continues and expands the trend towards
comprehensive natural gas regulation established in Transco and Northern
Natural. The holding reconfirms the Court's willingness to go beyond
the strict interpretation of the NGA and NGPA statutes to imply federal
jurisdiction over natural gas. Schneidewind is significant because the
Court uses the decision to draw an additional line between state and
federal regulatory power. States must now rely solely on FERC to protect
their citizens from the dangers that can result from a company choosing
to capitalize itself with too much or too little equity. The important
question which remains unanswered after Schneidewind is, Where does
the comprehensive nature of federal natural gas regulation end?
PETER WIRTH

